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HAS DELAWARE BECOME THE “NEW”
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS? THE
UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES OF THE AIA
Fabio E. Marino† & Teri H.P. Nguyen††
Abstract
To stem the rising tide of patent suits brought by non-practicing
entities (NPEs), Congress enacted the anti-joinder provisions of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) while, at nearly the same
time, the Federal Circuit issued a series of decisions making it easier
for defendants to transfer multi-defendant cases filed by NPEs away
from the Eastern District of Texas. The unexpected result of these
initiatives, however, has been that NPEs have selected the District of
Delaware as their new “forum of choice,” making it the most popular
forum for patent litigation in the country and displacing the Eastern
District of Texas.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 16, 2011, President Obama signed into law the
2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), aimed in part at
curbing patent suits brought by non-practicing entities (NPEs).1 Since
that time, however, the number of patent cases filed in the District of
Delaware has risen steadily, making it the most popular venue for
patent litigation in the country, a position previously held by the
Eastern District of Texas for many years.2
Ironically, the AIA’s anti-joinder provisions, codified at 35
U.S.C. Section 299, were enacted by Congress to prevent patent
holders from joining multiple defendants in the same action based
merely on the assertion of the same patent(s).3 In the decade
preceding the enactment of the AIA, in fact, NPEs (sometimes
derogatorily referred to as “patent trolls” by the patent defense bar)
had made it a practice to sue multiple defendants and, in some
instances, even entire industries, in a single patent infringement suit in
the plaintiff friendly courts of the Eastern District of Texas.4 When
defendants with little to no connection to that forum tried to transfer
cases to more defendant friendly jurisdictions, courts in the Eastern
District of Texas often relied on the judicial economies achieved by
having the same court address the issues common to all defendants
(e.g., invalidity or claim construction) to deny transfer motions.5
While the AIA was making its way through Congress, however,
the Federal Circuit granted a number of requests by defendants to
transfer patent cases out of the Eastern District of Texas and, in the
process, articulated a more lenient standard for transferring cases out
of jurisdictions with little connection to the case.6
The cumulative effect of the enactment of the AIA with the more
permissive jurisprudence on motions to transfer was to make it harder
for NPEs to file multi-defendant cases in the Eastern District of Texas
and keep them there. As a result, NPEs started looking for a new
venue to file multi-defendant actions. Recent survey data on new
1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012).
2. Alex Lawson, Delaware Eclipses Texas as Patent Hot Spot, LAW360 (Sept. 16,
2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/473097/delaware-eclipses-texas-as-patent-hot-spot.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 299.
4. Michael Liu, Joinder Under the AIA: Shifting Non-Practicing Entity Patent
Assertions Away from Small Businesses, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 489, 500-02
(2012).
5. Id.; see, e.g., In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
6. See, e.g., In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d at 1360; In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp.,
662 F.3d 1221, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Altera Corp., 494 F. App’x 52, 53 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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patent suit filings suggests that NPE’s have found a new “forum of
choice” in the District of Delaware, likely because most large U.S.
corporations are incorporated in that jurisdiction and the courts in that
district have been hesitant to grant motions to transfer filed by
Delaware corporations.7 This article examines how the enactment of
the AIA’s anti-joinder provisions and the recent transfer jurisprudence
by the Federal Circuit have combined to bring about this dramatic
shift in the geographic distribution of patent litigation.
I.

THE NPE OR “PATENT TROLL”

Non-practicing entities (NPEs) are companies that own patents,
but instead of making products that practice the patents, they generate
revenue by licensing and asserting patents against alleged infringers
to extract license fees.8 The 2012 NPE Activity Report prepared by
RPX Corporation defines NPEs to include: (1) patent assertion
entities (PAEs), (2) universities and research institutions, (3)
individual inventors, and (4) non-competing entities (NCEs) or
operating companies asserting patents outside their areas of products
or services.9
According to a report by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
the NPEs’ business model focuses on “buying and asserting patents
against companies that have already begun using them.”10 As a result,
the NPEs’ business model depends on generating more revenue from
licensing and enforcement activities than the costs of obtaining such
revenue.
II. THE COST OF LITIGATION
NPEs assert that by buying patents from individual inventors,
they enable small inventors to profit from their inventions when they

7. 35 U.S.C. § 299; David O. Taylor et al., The America Invents Act: Target, the
Eastern District of Texas, 15 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 471, 482 (2012); Erin Coe, Texas
Hang-Ups May Boost Patent Suits in Delaware, LAW360 (May 8, 2009, 12:00 AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/100540/texas-hang-ups-may-boost-patent-suits-in-delaware.
8. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, & OFFICE OF
SCI. & TECH. POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S.
INNOVATION
(2013),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
9. RPX CORP., 2012 NPE ACTIVITY REPORT 7 (2013), available at
http://www.rpxcorp.com/siteFiles/SiteManager/0BF995E82CFF591EE80EFE8AC69259E7.pdf.
10. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 50-51 (2011); BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.
R42668, AN OVERVIEW OF THE “PATENT TROLLS” DEBATE 1 (2013).
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would otherwise lack the abilities to do so on their own. Nathan
Myhrvold, the CEO of Intellectual Ventures, articulated the NPEs’
views on this subject in a recent interview:
Q: You just buy up patents and then you sue people, and I don’t
understand how that helps innovation and creativity in the world.
A: If people create something and don’t get paid, that’s a problem.
It’s very hard for individual inventors to get paid. For the same
reason that private equity is valuable—broadly, that’s a good
thing—in the case of patents, many that own them aren’t in a good
11
position to take the next step.”

Even opponents of NPE litigation have recognized that in the
past:
[S]ome NPEs have played a valuable role in bringing innovations
from small inventors to market. Some inventors lack the resources
and expertise needed to successfully license their technologies or,
if necessary, to enforce their patents. NPEs provide a way for
these inventors to earn rents that they might not otherwise realize,
12
thus providing them with greater incentives to innovate.

However, empirical studies have shown that NPE litigation does
not provide incentives for innovation. For example, one study found
that NPEs impose costs on large technology companies and many
small and medium firms, “making it even less likely that innovative
start-ups are net beneficiaries of NPE activity.”13 That same study
reported that small and medium-sized companies make up 90% of the
defendants sued by NPEs.14 Another study reported that at least one
company in the health information space had ceased innovation and
development altogether while fending off patent infringement threats
by an NPE.15
Professors Bessen and Meurer identified in their study three

11. Darren Murph, Intellectual Ventures’ Nathan Myhrvold Defends Patent Trolling,
Calls Tech Industry Immature, ENGADGET (May 30, 2012, 2:33 PM),
http://www.engadget.com/2012/05/30/intellectual-ventures-nathan-myhrvold-defends-patenttrolling/.
12. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Cost of NPE Disputes (Boston Univ.
School
of
Law,
Paper
No.
12-34,
2012),
available
at
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/BessenJ_MeurerM06251
2rev062812.pdf.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT
ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION (2013).
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losses associated with NPE litigation.16 First, the risk of litigation is a
disincentive to innovation.17 The anticipated risk of future lawsuitrelated losses is factored into the cost of a firm’s development of new
technology and products, particularly for firms that invest heavily in
research and development (R&D).18 In fact, Bessen and Meurer
reported that the more a firm spent on R&D, the more likely it was to
be sued for patent infringement.19 Their study concluded that even if
incentives provided by NPE litigation to small inventors “were much
more fertile than incentives provided to large technology firms—
producing two, three or even ten times as many innovations—the
incentives flowing to small inventors would not offset the much larger
disincentives imposed on the technology firms.”20
Second, the threat of NPE litigation may even hurt independent
inventors who seek to sell or license their patents to larger firms.21
The expectation of an NPE lawsuit may depress the amount a licensee
or buyer is willing to pay for a patent.22 Third, Bessen and Meurer
posit that:
NPE activity may skew the research agenda of small firms away
from disruptive technologies and toward mainstream technology
and associated patents that can be asserted against big incumbents.
Even worse, small firms are encouraged to divert investment from
genuine invention toward simply obtaining broad and vague
23
patents that might one day lead to a credible, if weak, lawsuit.

Others investigating the “myths” about NPEs regarding benefits
they provide to society, such as Michael Risch, have found little
supporting evidence.24 For example, the myth that NPEs are
“vindicating the rights of small companies forced out of business by
infringers” is unsupported by the evidence.25 Risch’s study showed
that, in fact, very few of the initial owners of the patents later
acquired by NPEs actually failed, and in fact, the patents were held

16. James Bessen, Jennifer Ford, & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of
Patent Trolls (Boston Univ. School of Law, Paper No. 11-45, 2011) available at
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/Bessen-Ford-Meurer-troll.html.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 21.
20. Bessen et al., supra note 16.
21. Id. at 22.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457 (2012).
25. Id.
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for a long time before they were asserted.26
The social benefits NPEs may offer, if any, are minimal and
outweighed by the private and social costs they impose. Bessen and
Meurer found that in 2011, the enforcement activities of patent trolls
cost defendants and licensees $29 billion, a dramatic 400% increase
from $7 billion in 2005.27 The AIPLA recently reported that median
litigation cost for defending claims of patent infringement by NPEs
had a median of $4 million per case where the amount in controversy
exceeded $25 million (Figure 1).28
Figure 1.
Amount In Controversy
Less than $1 million

End of Discovery
$300,000

Inclusive, All costs
$600,000

$1-$10 million

$750,000

$1.25 million

$10-$25 million

$1.5 million

$2.4 million

$1-$25 million

$983,000

$1.75 million

More than $25 million

$2.5 million

$4 million

Even though defending a patent infringement action is
expensive, over a third of the costs imposed by NPEs on defendants
involve assertions that do not even go to court.29 Surveys of
companies threatened by NPEs, but that settled without litigation,
found that costs incurred resulted mainly from legal fees and
settlement costs to patent holders, including costs associated with
NPE-specific patent buying programs, clearance searches, and reexaminations of NPE patents.30 Whether resolved in or out of court,
it is clear that the direct and indirect costs of NPE assertions refute the

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
YEH, supra note 10, at 2; Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12 at 18-19.
AM. INTEL. PROP. LAW ASS’N., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 35 (2013).
See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12.
Id.
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proposition that NPEs play a significant role in promoting innovation.
Although prosecuting a patent infringement action is also
expensive, by suing several defendants in single lawsuit, NPEs
capitalize on economies of scale31 and charge forth with multiple
lawsuits for the price of one.
NPEs using such tactics are typically willing to settle for small
payments, often no more than the amount a defendant would spend on
legal fees to defend the case.32
III. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS
Research published by PricewaterhouseCoopers, based on
statistics collected from 1995 through 2012, found that while NPEs
had an overall success rate of 24% at summary judgment, as
compared to 34% for practicing entities, both had the same 66%
success rate at trial.33
The majority of NPE litigations, however, result in settlements.34
Not surprisingly, the majority of these settlements were for amounts
below the defendants’ estimated cost of defense.35 This may be an
indicator that at least some of the NPE-initiated litigation is driven by
financial considerations rather than the merits. For example, in EonNet LP v. Flagstar Bancorp,36 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s finding that Eon-Net filed an objectively baseless
infringement action in bad faith and for an improper extortion-like
purpose:
In addition to finding that Eon-Net filed an objectively baseless
infringement action, the district court also determined that Eon-Net
filed the lawsuit in bad faith and for an improper purpose. In
particular, the district court found that Eon-Net’s case against
Flagstar had “indicia of extortion” because it was part of Eon-Net’s

31. Ahmed J. Davis & Karolina Jesien, The Balance of Power in Patent Law: Moving
Towards Effectiveness in Addressing Patent Troll Concerns, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 835, 850 (2012).
32. See, e.g., Parallel Networks LLC v. Oriental Trading Company, Inc., No. 6:10-CV00474 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2010).
33. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 5 (2013), available
at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigationstudy.pdf (finding that NPEs have been successful 24% of the time overall versus 34% for
practicing entities, due to the relative lack of success for NPEs at summary judgment. However,
both have about a two-thirds success rate at trial).
34. Bessen et al., supra note 16, at 16; YEH, supra note 10, at 12.
35. See YEH, supra note 10; John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent
Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 694 (2011).
36. Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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history of filing nearly identical patent infringement complaints
against a plethora of diverse defendants, where Eon-Net followed
each filing with a demand for a quick settlement at a price far
lower than the cost to defend the litigation.
The record supports the district court’s finding that Eon-Net
acted in bad faith by exploiting the high cost to defend complex
37
litigation to extract a nuisance value settlement from Flagstar.

The Federal Circuit went on to describe the uneven power
enjoyed by NPEs:
In addition to its ability to impose high costs to defend against its
meritless claims, Eon-Net placed little at risk when filing suit. As
a non-practicing entity, Eon-Net was generally immune to
counterclaims for patent infringement, antitrust, or unfair
competition because it did not engage in business activities that
would potentially give rise to those claims. And while Eon-Net
risked licensing revenue should its patents be found invalid or if a
court narrowly construed the patents’ claims to exclude valuable
targets, Eon-Net did not face any business risk resulting from the
loss of patent protection over a product or process. Its patents
38
protected only settlement receipts, not its own products.

As another example, in a case in which the plaintiff sued 124
defendants for infringing a single patent, “the Court asked plaintiff
why it elected to sue such a large number of defendants at once, as
opposed to the more common approach of selecting a few target
defendants to proceed against first.”39 In response, the Plaintiff, an
NPE, responded that “its strategy made sense from a cost view” and
that “its strategy was not to go after one defendant and ask for $30
million” but “to go after a lot of defendants, get those issues resolved,
hopefully by settlement.”40 Tellingly, “[w]hen the Court specifically
inquired about what drives Plaintiff’s early settlement demands,
Plaintiff indicated that its process involves an analysis of Defendants’
sales as well as Defendants’ cost of defense.”41
Another Plaintiff lawyer explained the “cost of defense
settlement demand” as follows:
The more a patent is litigated, it tends to decrease in value as

37.

Id.

38. Id. at 1328.
39. See Memorandum Opinion and Order at 3, Parallel Networks LLC v. Oriental
Trading Company, Inc., No. 6:10-CV-00474 (E.D. Tex., Mar. 15, 2011).
40. Id. at 3-4.
41. Id. at 4.

MARINO & NGUYEN

536

2/19/2014 3:09 PM

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 30

people come up with better prior art or over-analyze the thing. An
NPE [non-practice entity] intuitively understands that we could go
for triples or home runs, but we can also go for singles and get a
good return and work on other things. . . . The licensor is of the
view that we don’t want to fight so price at a level to where it is
42
attractive not to fight.

Said differently, NPEs are “willing to take less than they are
entitled to in order to maintain the viability of the patent.”43 As
discussed further below, the AIA’s anti-joinder provision was
expected to discourage cost-of-defense suits by forcing plaintiffs to
bring multiple suits against each of the alleged infringers separately,
thereby increasing the NPEs’ litigation costs.44 Unlike companies
that make products, NPEs are not vulnerable to counter claims or
competitive harm to their business and/or reputation resulting from
their involvement in litigation. Thus, the AIA attempted to level the
playing field by making it more expensive for an NPE to assert a
patent.
IV. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 20(a)(2): PERMISSIVE
JOINDER OF PARTIES
Before the enactment of the AIA, Rule 20(a)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure governed joinder of defendants in one
action.45 Under Rule 20(a)(2), persons may be joined in one action as
defendants only if:
(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or
in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences;
and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise
46
in the action.

District courts were split in their application of Rule 20(a)(2),
however, with courts in the Eastern District of Texas taking a
different view than those in other jurisdictions. For example, in
MyMail v. AOL, the plaintiff sued multiple defendants in a single

42. David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation,
64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 371 (2012) (ellipsis in original).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 382-83.
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2).
46. Id.
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action alleging infringement of one patent.47 Defendants moved to
sever and transfer arguing that the claims did not arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence as the claims against the other defendants.48
The district court disagreed and concluded that the requirements of
Rule 20 were met where “there is some connection or logical
relationship between the various transactions or occurrences,” which
“exists if there is some nucleus of operative facts or law.”49 In
MyMail, Rule 20’s joinder requirements were satisfied because all
defendants shared a common legal question concerning the scope of
the patent.50
In Eolas v. Adobe, another Eastern District of Texas court denied
defendants’ request to sever because “[a]ll defendants are accused of
infringing the patents in suit, and adjudicating infringement will
require construing the claims and evaluating the patents’ innovation
over the prior art. Thus, determining defendants’ liability will involve
substantially overlapping questions of law and fact.”51
Courts in other jurisdictions, however, demanded more than the
mere allegation that defendants infringe the same patent for purposes
of joinder. In Rudd v. Lux Products, the district court stated that
“[a]fter researching the issue, the Court determines that [the Eastern
District of Texas’s] approach [to Rule 20] is in the minority.”52
Indeed, the Rudd court reasoned that the MyMail approach
“eviscerates the same transaction or occurrence requirement and
makes it indistinguishable from the requirement that there be a
common question of law or fact.” Allegations that unrelated
defendants infringe the same patents—and even sold similar
products—do not, without more, satisfy the requirements of Rule
20.53

47.
48.
49.

MyMail, Ltd. v. AOL, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
Id.
Id. at 456.

50.Id. at 457.
51. Memorandum Opinion and Order at *2, Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Adobe Systems,
Inc., No. 6:09-CV-446, 2010 WL 3835762 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2010); see also Sprint
Communications Co. v. TheGlobe.com, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 615 (D. Kan. 2006); Adrain v. Genetec
Inc., No. 2:08-CV-423, 2009 WL3063414 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2009); Better Educ. Inc. v.
Einstruction Corp., No. 2-08-CV-446-TJW-CE, 2010 WL 918307 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2010);
Mannatech, Inc.v. Country Life, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-533-O, 2010 WL 2944574 (N.D. Tex. July
26, 2010); Alford Safety Services, Inc., v. Hot-Hed, Inc., No. 10-1319, 2010 WL 3418233 (E.D.
La. Aug. 24, 2010).
52. Rudd v. Lux Products Corp., No. 09-CV-6957, 2011 WL 148052, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
12, 2011).
53. JOAO Control & Monitoring Sys. of Cal. v. ACTI Corp., No. SA CV10-01909 DOC
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Courts outside the Eastern District of Texas have acknowledged
the prejudice and dilemma imposed on defendants from having to
litigate patent infringement actions together. In WiAV Networks, a
court in the Northern District of California described the NPE
situation as follows: “Each defendant has simply been thrown into a
mass pit with others to suit plaintiff’s convenience. In this
connection, the accused defendants—who will surely have competing
interests and strategies—are also entitled to present individualized
assaults on questions of non-infringement, invalidity, and claim
construction.”54
In 2012, the Federal Circuit finally addressed the joinder issues
arising from the denial of defendants’ motion to sever and transfer in
In re EMC Corp., where it reversed the Eastern District of Texas
decision denying severance of eighteen independent defendants.55
The Federal Circuit held that joinder is not appropriate where
different products or processes are involved: “We agree that joinder is
not appropriate where different products or processes are involved.
Joinder of independent defendants is only appropriate where the
accused products or processes are the same in respects relevant to the
patent. But the sameness of the accused products or processes is not
sufficient.”56 Claims against defendants can only be joined if “the
facts underlying the claim of infringement asserted against each
defendant share an aggregate of operative facts.”57 Absent an “actual
link” between the facts, “independently developed products using
differently sourced parts are not part of the same transaction, even if
they are otherwise coincidentally identical.”58
Although In re EMC was decided before the enactment of the
AIA, and thus applied only Rule 20, it nevertheless reached a similar
conclusion as it would have under Section 299 of the AIA: joinder
requires more than the mere allegation that the same patent is
infringed.

(RNBx), 2011 WL 1519277, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2011); WiAV Networks LLC v. 3Com
Corp., No. C 10-3448-WHA, 2010 WL 3895047, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010) (“[N]umerous
courts have found that ‘joinder is often improper where [multiple] competing businesses have
allegedly infringed the same patent by selling different products.’”).
54. WiAV Networks, 2010 WL 3895047, at *2.
55. In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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V. ENACTMENT OF THE AIA
The split of authority among the district courts regarding the
construction of Rule 20(a) was expressly resolved by the signing into
law of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA).59 Section 299 of
the AIA, in fact, concerns the joinder of accused infringers and sets
forth what allegations are insufficient to bind independent defendants
together in one action or to consolidate separate actions for trial:
(a) Joinder of Accused Infringers—With respect to any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, other than
action or trial in which an act of infringement under section
271(e)(2) has been pled, parties that are accused infringers may be
joined in one action as defendants or counterclaim defendants, or
have their actions consolidated for trial, or counterclaim
defendants only if:
(1) any right to relief is asserted against the parties jointly,
severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences relating to the making, using, importing into the
United States, offering for sale, or selling of the same accused
product or process; and
(2) questions of fact common to all defendants or counterclaim
defendants will arise in the action.
(b) Allegations insufficient for joinder—For purposes of this
subsection, accused infringers may not be joined in one action as
defendants or counterclaim defendants, or have their actions
consolidated for trial, based solely on allegations that they each
have infringed the patent or patents-in-suit.
(c) Waiver—a party that is an accused infringer may waive the
60
limitations set forth in this section with respect to that party.

It is clear that Congress enacted Section 299 not only with NPEs
in mind, but also to address the problems arising from multidefendant patent litigation practice in the Eastern District of Texas.61
Indeed, the legislative history of the AIA confirms as much:
Section 299 of the AIA legislatively abrogates the construction
of Rule 20(a) adopted in MyMail, Ltd. v. America Online, Inc.,
223 F.R.D. 455 (E.D. Tex. 2004); Sprint Communications Co. v.
Theglobe.com, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 615 (D. Kan. 2006); Adrain v.

59.
60.
61.

See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012).
Id.
See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 55 n.61 (2011).
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Genetec Inc., 2009 WL3063414 (E.D. Tex. September 22, 2009);
Better Educ. Inc. v. Einstruction Corp., 2010 WL 918307 (E.D.
Tex. March 10, 2010); Mannatech, Inc. v. Country Life, LLC, 2010
WL 2944574 (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2010); Alford Safety Services,
Inc., v. Hot-Hed, Inc., 2010 WL 3418233 (E.D. La. August 24,
2010); and Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., 2010
WL 3835762 (E.D. Tex. September 28, 2010)—effectively
conforming these courts’ jurisprudence to that followed by a
majority of jurisdictions. See generally Rudd v. Lux Products
62
Corp., 2011 WL 148052 (N.D. Ill. January 12, 2011).

While closely following the language of Rule 20, Section 299(a)
adds the further requirement that the claim must arise out of the same
transaction relating to the same accused product or process.63 The
requirement that the accused infringers be linked by more than a
patent infringement allegation is consistent with the procedures
followed by a majority of jurisdictions. Courts have traditionally held
that claims against separate defendants arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence only when the claims “refer[] to
similarit[ies] in the factual background of a claim.”64
Although the legislative history of the AIA devoted relatively
little attention to the joinder issue, it is plain from the text that Section
299(b) “represents Congress’s effort to limit the ability of plaintiffs to
file multi-defendant patent infringement suits.”65 Section 299(b)
expressly precludes plaintiffs from bringing suits against multiple
defendants where the only common links are issues stemming from
the allegation that they infringe the same patent. The House Report
accompanying H.R. 1249 (the bill that resulted in the AIA) explained
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. See 35 U.S.C. § 299.
64. Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added); see also,
EIT Holdings LLC v. Yelp!, Inc., No. C 10-05623, 2011 WL 2192820, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 12,
2011) (finding joinder improper where defendants’ “websites implement different
functionalities, through different software, that works in different ways”); Sorensen v. DMS
Holdings, Inc., No. 08-CV-559, 2010 WL 4909615, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2010) (“alleging a
common manufacturer and infringement of the same patent is not enough to support joinder
where defendants are unrelated companies, selling different products”); Children’s Network,
LLC v. PixFusion LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d 404, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Joinder of unrelated
parties into one action is generally inappropriate where, as here, the infringement of the same
patent is alleged, but the products are different.”); N.J. Mach. Inc. v. Alford Indus., Inc., No. 891879, 1991 WL 340196, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 1991) (finding joinder of “claims of infringement
against unrelated defendants, involving different machines” improper where “the plaintiff fails
to adequately allege or support any connection or substantial similarity between the machines of
the proposed defendants”).
65. MAYA ECKSTEIN ET AL., THE (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES OF THE AIA JOINDER
PROVISION (2012).
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that, “New 299 also clarifies that joinder will not be available if it [is]
based solely on allegations that a defendant has infringed the patent(s)
in question.”66 The debate on the floor of the Senate specifically
emphasized that infringement of the same patent was never enough to
satisfy Rule 20, even before Section 299, outside the Eastern District
of Texas:
Section 19(d) of the present bill adds a new section 299 to title 35.
This new section bars joinder of accused infringers as
codefendants, or consolidation of their cases for trial, if the only
common fact and transaction among the defendants is that they are
alleged to have infringed the same patent. This provision
effectively codifies current law as it has been applied everywhere
outside of the Eastern District of Texas. See Rudd v. Lux
Products Corp., 2011 WL 148052 (N.D. Ill. January 12, 2011),
67
and the committee report for this bill at pages 54 through 55.

Section 299 thus makes it legally and economically more
difficult to bring suit against multiple unrelated defendants. First,
under the AIA, in order to bring suit against multiple defendants at
the same time, the NPE must allege joint and/or several liability
among the multiple defendants and the alleged infringement must
relate to the same transaction or occurrence . . . relating to the
infringement of the same accused product or process.68 Second,
NPEs will incur additional administrative costs filing and maintaining
multiple lawsuits, sometimes in different venues. Having to split
patent cases across multiple venues will increase the costs and
burdens of litigation.69 Furthermore, as noted above, “[t]he more a
patent is litigated, [the more] it tends to decrease in value as people
come up with better prior art or over-analyze the thing.”70
VI. NPES CONTINUE TO FILE RECORD NUMBER OF PATENT
INFRINGEMENT CASES
In the days before the AIA went into effect, there was a
noticeable spike in patent filings in the Eastern District of Texas.
Many viewed the move as a “rush to the courthouse” to take
66. H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 55 (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112hrpt98/pdf/CRPT-112hrpt98-pt1.pdf.
67. 157 Cong. Rec. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis
added).
68. 35 U.S.C. § 299.
69. Schwartz, supra note 42, at 383; Marla Butler, Strategies for Dealing with the NonJoinder Provision, MANAGING IP, March 2012, at 42.
70. Schwartz, supra note 42, at 371.
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advantage of the Eastern District-style multi-defendant practice
before it went away forever. The weekly number of complaints filed
in the Eastern District of Texas between September 2 and September
16, 2011, was over one hundred—nearly double the average over the
preceding year.71
Indeed, the overall number of patent infringement cases brought
by NPEs since the AIA was enacted has increased. In 2011, a total of
1551 NPE patent cases were filed nationally.72 In 2012, a record
3054 new NPE patent infringement cases were filed, a 97% increase
over 2011, and a 388% increase over 2008.73 This increase, however,
may be an artifact of the AIA. For example, as one study suggested,
the “legislative changes could have the effect of inflating the number
of cases filed, without reflecting a true increase in the amount of
litigation.”74 In other words, the post-AIA filings are likely due to
NPEs filing multiple single-defendant cases rather than a single
multiple-defendant lawsuit. This is supported by RPX data showing a
61% reduction in the number of defendants sued in each case since
2011: the 1551 NPE patent cases filed nationally in 2011 had an
average of 3.6 defendants per case, whereas the 3054 NPE patent
cases filed in 2012 had an average of 1.4 defendants per case.75 In
summary, the total number of defendants sued by NPEs decreased by
18% from 2011 to 2012, from 5329 defendants to 4351 defendants,
respectively.76 This comports with a recent Lex Machina study
showing that the number of defendants sued by “patent monetization
entities”77 in 2012 actually decreased from 2011 (Figure 2).78

71. INTEL. PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, IMPACT OF THE MISJOINDER PROVISION OF THE
AMERICA INVENTS ACT 12 (2012) (citing data retrieved from Docket Navigator for the Eastern
District of Texas).
72. RPX CORP., supra note 9, at 11.
73. Id.
74. Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of
Patent Monetization Entities, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK 57 (April 9, 2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247195.
75. RPX CORP., supra note 9, at 11.
76. Id.
77. Feldman et al., supra note 74. The term, “patent monetization entities” as used in this
study describes “those whose primary focus is deriving income from licensing and litigation, as
opposed to making products.” Id. at 19-20.
78. Id.
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Figure 2.
Year

Number of Defendants

2007

2640

2008

1809

2011

6208

2012

4475

One possible explanation for the increase in 2011 and
subsequent drop in 2012 is the “rush to the courthouse” phenomenon
caused by the enactment of the AIA. Other commentators, however,
have suggested that the enactment of Section 299 was at least
partially successful in reducing the amount of NPE litigation activity,
an indication that NPEs are now more discriminating when picking
potential defendants.79
VII.SECTION 299 OF THE AIA DOES NOT APPLY TO PRE-TRIAL
CONSOLIDATION
When H.R. 1249 (the bill that resulted in the AIA) was originally
introduced, it “applied only to joinder of defendants in one action.”80
But in a manager’s amendment, the bill was extended to also bar
consolidation for trials of separate actions adding the phrase “or have
their actions consolidated for trial.”81 Senator Kyl’s initial skepticism
with respect to the proposed expansion of the bill to preclude
consolidation for trial was resolved after a review of legal authority
that “reveals that under current law, even if parties cannot be joined
as defendants under rule 20, their cases can still be consolidated for
79. See Lisa Shuchman, Study: Eastern District of Texas Reclaims Top Spot for New
Patent
Suit
Filings,
THE
RECORDER
(Jan.
15,
2013),
http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202584588647 (citing analysis by James Pistorino reporting
the total number of defendants in all new suits in all districts nationwide declined by 15.4%
from 14,201 in 2011 to 12,013 in 2012); RPX CORP., supra note 9 (reporting the total number of
defendants added in 2012 decreased by 17% from 2011 total).
80. 157 Cong. Rec. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
81. Id.
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trial under rule 42.”82 Upon such review, Senator Kyl acknowledged:
If a court that was barred from joining defendants in one action
could instead simply consolidate their cases for trial under rule 42,
section 299’s purpose of allowing unrelated patent defendants to
insist on being tried separately would be undermined. Section 299
thus adopts a common standard for both joinder of defendants and
83
consolidation of their cases for trial.

Significantly, Section 299(b) clarifies that the mere allegation
that each accused infringer has infringed the same patent is
insufficient to meet the “same transaction or occurrence” requirement
of Section 299(a) (and Rule 20 of the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure).84 In other words, accused infringers may not (1) be
joined as co-defendants in one action, or (2) have their otherwise
separate actions be consolidated for trial, based solely on allegations
that they each infringed the patents-in-suit.
By delineating only two circumstances (joinder and
consolidation for trial) in which multiple defendants cannot be forced
to cooperate when their sole connection is the alleged infringing of a
patent, Congress left the issue of consolidation for pre-trial purposes
to the court’s discretion under Rule 42.
In other words, NPEs can still litigate multiple lawsuits against
multiple defendants by seeking consolidation of the separately filed
cases for pre-trial proceedings.
VIII.PRETRIAL CONSOLIDATION RULES ARE ABOUT JUDICIAL
EFFICIENCY, NOT FAIRNESS TO DEFENDANTS
Although Rule 42 “provides a mechanism for district courts to
better conserve judicial resources via consolidation for certain
common issues such as pretrial, Markman, or trial,”85 the opportunity
to consolidate multiple actions for pre-trial purposes allows NPEs to
regain some of the ground lost under the AIA.
Rule 42(a) permits consolidation “[i]f actions before the court
involve a common question of law or fact.”86 When a common
question of law or fact exists, “[t]he court may (1) join the actions for
hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2)

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Leahy Smith Amerca Invents Act of 2011, 35 U.S.C. § 299(b) (2012).
85. Norman IP Holdings, LLC v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. 6:11-CV-495, 2012 WL
3307942, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2012).
86
Id. at *3.
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consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid
unnecessary cost or delay.”87 In re EMC made clear that district
courts have considerable discretion to consolidate cases:
In exercising its discretion, the district court should keep in mind
that even if joinder is not permitted under Rule 20, the district
court has considerable discretion to consolidate cases for discovery
and for trial under Rule 42 where venue is proper and there is only
“a common question of law or fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a); see 9A
Wright et al., supra, § 2382 (“[T]he existence of a common
question by itself is enough to permit consolidation under Rule
88
42(a), even if the claims arise out of independent transactions.”).

The fact of the matter is that in patent cases most of the pre-trial
issues bear directly on legal questions concerning the patent; for
example, claim construction and validity are common to all actions
involving the same patent.
For example, in Norman IP Holdings, LLC v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc.,
Judge Davis explained the goals and benefits of Rule 42 in light of the
AIA:
This Court has limited resources and constantly strives to employ
efficient and cost-saving case-management procedures for the
benefit of the parties, counsel, and the Court. See WordCheck
Tech, LLC v. Alt-N Techs, Ltd.,No. 6:10-cv-457 (E.D. Tex. July 20,
2011) (permitting limited early discovery to facilitate early
mediation discussion); Parallel Networks, LLC v. Abercrombie &
Fitch, No. 6:10-cv-111 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2011) (employing an
early Markman proceeding to efficiently resolve a multi-defendant
case). In response to the AIA’s joinder provision, plaintiffs now
serially file multiple single-defendant (or defendant group) cases
involving the same underlying patents. This presents
administrative challenges for the Court and, left unchecked, wastes
judicial resources by requiring common issues to be addressed
individually for each case. For example, what was once a single
motion to substitute parties (or join a plaintiff) becomes multiple
motions. See, e.g., Klausner Techs., Inc. v. The Broadvox Holding
Co., LLC, No. 6:11-cv-575 (E.D. Tex. June 6, 2012) (order
granting motion to substitute plaintiff—over thirty similar motions
were filed in related cases). These must each be processed by the
Court and staff, including review of the underlying motions and
docketing individual orders addressing each motion. More
substantive motions, particularly where the same arguments are

87.
88.

Id. at *3-4.
In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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used in each individual case, present even more difficulties. There,
the Court is required to waste time digesting duplicate arguments
to ensure that new arguments are not hidden among the plethora of
common arguments.
Federal Rule of Procedure 42 provides a mechanism for district
courts to better conserve judicial resources via consolidation for
certain common issues such as pretrial, Markman, or trial. The
Federal Circuit has recently reiterated that district courts may
consolidate matters that share a common question of law or fact.
See In re EMC, 677 F.3d at 1360; see also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Med.
Components, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-32-TS-EJF, slip op. at 2-3 (D. Utah
July 25, 2012) (recognizing that the AIA does not affect a district
court’s ability to consolidate related patent cases for pretrial
89
matters).

When asked how receptive he thought judges would be to
requests to consolidate for pretrial purposes actions filed against
individual defendants asserting the same patents, retired Judge
Everingham stated:
Most judges would do that even under the old law. If there is an
opportunity to do one Markman instead of seventeen, I am all for
one . . . . There are some real inefficiencies from the multiple trial
aspect and judges should decrease these inefficiencies by
90
consolidating trials whenever possible.

A review of Docket Navigator’s Patent Litigation Statistics
shows a significant increase in the number of motions to consolidate
or relate actions filed since the AIA passed (Figure 3).91

89. Norman IP Holdings, 2012 WL 3307942, at *4.
90. David O. Taylor et al., supra note 7, at *483; see also Abbott Diabetes Care, Inc. v.
Dexcom, Inc., 2007 WL 2892707, at *3 (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2007) (“Decisions to
consolidate cases are discretionary, but often courts balance considerations of efficiency,
expenses, and fairness.”)
91. Table reflects motions to consolidate and/or relate as reported by Docket Navigator.
See
Patent
Litigation
Statistics,
DocketNavigator
(Oct.
8,
2013),
https://www.docketnavigator.com/stats/. Table also only reflects instances where the motion
was granted, denied, and/or stipulated to by the parties. It does not reflect partial grants/denials,
nor instances where the motion was deemed moot by the court.
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Figure 3. 2010 and 2011 Motions to Consolidate/Relate Actions
2010

92

2011

Granted

Denied

Granted

Denied

E.D. Texas

10

5

15

0

N.D. Cal.

8

5

28

37

D. Delaware

1

7

6

1

Figure 4. 2012 and 2013 Motions to Consolidate/Relate Actions
2012

93

2013 (YTD)

Granted

Denied

Granted

Denied

E.D. Texas

141

11

117

4

N.D. Cal.

34

18

23

9

D. Delaware

12

0

13

0

While these statistics alone do not prove cause and effect, they
are consistent with the general perception that NPEs are finding ways
around the AIA by filing separate actions, against a large number of
defendants for infringement of the same patents and consolidating

92. Table reflects motions to consolidate and/or relate as reported by Docket Navigator.
Id. Table also only reflects instances where the motion was granted, denied, and/or stipulated to
by the parties. It does not reflect partial grants/denials, nor instances where the motion was
deemed moot by the court.
93. Table reflects motions to consolidate and/or relate as reported by Docket Navigator.
Id. Table also only reflects instances where the motion was granted, denied, and/or stipulated to
by the parties. It does not reflect partial grants/denials, nor instances where the motion was
deemed moot by the court.
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them for all pre-trial purposes.
Given that only about 3% of patent cases actually go to trial, the
likelihood that an NPE might have to conduct several trials against
multiple defendants is low.94 As one commentator recognized,
“[t]hese consolidated defendants cannot be tried together, but as trial
is highly unlikely anyway, the only real effect that the AIA appears to
have had is to require additional filing fees from the plaintiff.”95
IX. THE MOVE TO DELAWARE
To take advantage of the pre-trial consolidation mechanisms of
Rule 42(a), however, NPEs must file the cases within the same
district (and make sure the cases are assigned to the same court).96
NPEs forced to maintain patent cases across multiple venues—rather
than the single forum of choice—will face substantial increases in the
costs and burdens of litigation.97 Having the cases assigned to
multiple courts also provides the potential for inconsistent results on
issues such as claim construction and validity.
NPEs, however, appear to have found a way to overcome this
obstacle.
When the AIA passed, some legal commentators
hypothesized that it may shift the patent litigation spotlight to
Delaware, where the vast majority of companies are incorporated.98
Recent data reveals a trend among NPEs to file in the District of
Delaware, confirming those earlier predictions.99
The Eastern District of Texas has historically been considered a
haven for patent troll litigation due to its reputation for having
plaintiff-friendly rules and juries.100 This has not changed since the

94. Mark Lemley, Where To File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 413 (2010)
(“While on average only 2.8% of patent cases go to trial, a far higher percentage make it to trial
in the District of Delaware, the Eastern District of Texas, the Western District of Wisconsin, and
the Eastern District of Virginia.”).
95. Brenna Legaard, Has Patent Reform Changed Texas?, LITIGATION JOURNAL, Spring
2013, at 8-13, available at http://www.osblitigation.com/lj2013-spring.pdf.
96. Multidistrict litigation under 24 U.S.C. Section 1407 has also become a strategic
solution to Section 299.
97. See Schwartz, supra note 42, at 383; Butler, supra note 69.
98. Ryan Davis, Del. May Eclipse Texas as Top Patent Venue Under AIA, LAW360 (Oct.
28, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/278301/del-may-eclipse-texas-as-toppatent-venue-under-aia.
99. Press Release, Perkins Coie, Unprecedented Patent Case Concentration (Sept. 16,
2013), available at http://www.perkinscoie.com/unprecedented-patent-case-concentration/.
100. Ted Frank, Why is the Eastern District of Texas home to so many patent trolls?,
POINTOFLAW.COM,
(Aug.
24,
2011,
11:35
AM),
http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/2011/08/why-is-the-east.php; Julie Creswell, So Small a

MARION & NGUYEN

2014]

2/19/2014 3:09 PM

CONSEQUENCES OF THE AIA

549

passage of the AIA; the Eastern District of Texas remains a popular
forum for NPEs. RPX data concluded that in 2012, the majority of
NPE patent filings originated in the Eastern District of Texas
representing 32% of new cases filed and 36% of total defendants.101
The District of Delaware (24% of NPE cases filed in 2012; 20% of
total defendants) came in second, followed by the Central District of
California (10% of NPE cases filed in 2012; 9% of total defendants)
as the forum of choice by NPEs.102
In 2013, the headline changed: “Delaware Eclipses Texas as
Patent Hot Spot.”103 According to a mid-year analysis of patent
filings, in 2012, 992 patent cases were filed in the District of
Delaware.104 Through September 10, 2013, 1015 patent cases had
been filed in Delaware, surpassing the 920 patent cases filed in the
Eastern District of Texas.105 The number of new patent cases filed in
Delaware now amounts to 23.87% of the national total.106
Delaware’s rise in popularity as a destination for NPEs can be
the result of many factors. One hypothesis is the District of
Delaware’s relatively strict jurisprudence on issues of venue and
forum non conveniens. An analysis of transfer decisions from the
District of Delaware shows that unless there is a related litigation
pending in another district or the defendants’ operations are regional
in nature, transferring a case out of Delaware is more difficult than in
the Eastern District of Texas.
For example, in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Checkpoint
Software Techs., Judge Stark denied defendants’ motion to transfer,
reasoning that the Federal Circuit opinions finding an abuse of
discretion in the Eastern District of Texas cases discussed above did
not affect his analysis under Third Circuit law. 107 In so doing, Judge
Stark spelled out the key differences between the Fifth Circuit
jurisprudence and that of the Third Circuit with respect to transfer

Town, So Many Patent Suits, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/business/24ward.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
101. RPX CORP., supra note 9, at 15.
102. Id.
103. Lawson, supra note 2.
104. Perkins Coie, supra note 99.
105. Id.; see also, Lawson, supra note 2.
106. Perkins Coie, supra note 99.
107. See, e.g., In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (granting
mandamus); In re Acer America Corp., 626 F.3d 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (same); In re HoffmanLa Roche Inc., 587 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (same); In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (same); In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (same).
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motions:
Transfer analysis under the law of the Third Circuit differs from
that in the Fifth Circuit in at least the following significant
respects: (i) plaintiff’s choice of forum is explicitly a factor to be
weighed (and weighed heavily) in the Third Circuit, while in the
Fifth Circuit, it is error to consider plaintiff’s preference as a
separate factor, see TS Tech, 551 F.3d at 1320 (“Fifth Circuit
precedent clearly forbids treating the plaintiff’s choice of venue as
a distinct factor in the § l404(a) analysis.”); (ii) in the recent
Federal Circuit cases, the parties generally were not incorporated
in Texas, whereas in almost all the cases arising in this District,
most if not all of the defendants (and often the plaintiffs as well)
are incorporated in Delaware, which the Federal Circuit has
recognized as an important factor, see Micron, 645 F.3d at 1332,
2011 WL 1815975, at *18 (“[G]iven that both parties were
incorporated in Delaware, they had both willingly submitted to suit
there, which weighs in favor of keeping the litigation in
Delaware.”); and (iii) the Fifth Circuit has endorsed a “100 mile
rule,” which provides that “when the distance between a plaintiff’s
chosen venue for trial and the potential transferee venue is more
than 100 miles, the factor of inconvenience to witnesses increases
in direct relationship to the additional distance to be traveled,” TS
Tech, 551 F.3d at 1320 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted); see also Genentech, 566 F.3d at 1343, while no such rule
108
has been recognized in the Third Circuit.

The District of Delaware has historically placed a heavy
emphasis on a plaintiff’s choice of forum if it is the plaintiff’s “home
turf,” in which case it is presumptively entitled to “paramount
deference.”109 In Delaware, an entity’s “home turf” includes its state
of incorporation, and there is little sympathy for parties, namely
defendants with nationwide sales and operations, who are later sued
there.110
In In re Link_A_Media Devices, however, the Federal Circuit
108. Intellectual Ventures I v. Checkpoint Software, 797 F. Supp. 2d 472, 487 (D. Del.
2011) (evaluating the private and public interest factors under Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55
F.3d 873, 879 (3d. Cir.1995)).
109. In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
110. Netgear, Inc. v. Ruckus Wireless, Inc., No. 10-999-SLR, 2011 WL 3236043, at *3
(D. Del. Aug. 5, 2011) (denying motion to transfer and stating, “As always, the court stresses
that, because defendant is a Delaware corporation, it has no reason to complain about being sued
in Delaware”); XPRT Ventures, LLC v. Ebay, Inc., No. 10-595-SLR, 2011 WL 2270402, at *3
(D. Del. June 8, 2011) (denying motion to transfer even though several defendants were
incorporated in Delaware and several—including plaintiff—had their principal place of business
outside of Delaware).
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criticized a District of Delaware decision denying transfer for its
“heavy reliance” on a party’s state of incorporation in its Jumara
analysis, stating that the court “placed far too much weight on the
plaintiff’s choice of forum,” and that its “heavy reliance on the fact
that [the defendant] was incorporated in Delaware was similarly
inappropriate.”111 Later, in In re Altera, the Federal Circuit again
evaluated a petition for writ of mandamus concerning the District of
Delaware’s denial of a motion to transfer and stated that,
“[defendants’] status as Delaware corporations is not entitled to
controlling weight insofar as no office or employees are located in
Delaware.”112 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit denied mandamus
and distinguished In re Link_A_Media where all of the parties were
Delaware corporations.113
Whether these recent Federal Circuit decisions addressing the
District of Delaware’s venue analysis will translate into more
transfers out of Delaware remains to be seen. But the raw numbers
from Docket Navigator’s patent litigation statistics suggests some
reprieve for defendants with more transfer motions granted in 2013
following In re Link_A_Media than in previous years:

111. In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
112. In re Altera Corp., 494 F. App’x 52 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2012).
113. Id. at 54 (“On that view, this case is clearly distinguishable; in its thorough opinion,
the district court endeavored to evaluate each of the forum non conveniens factors in light of the
same arguments raised in the petition, and there is no clear indication that the court failed to
meaningfully consider the merits of the transfer motion. Moreover, as noted above, in this case,
unlike Link_A_Media, there are rational grounds for denying transfer given that all of the parties
(not just a single defendant) had incorporated in Delaware and some witnesses would potentially
find Delaware more convenient.”).
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Figure 5. Delaware Transfer of Venue Orders (Convenience)
Year

Granted

Denied

2010

5

2

2011

7

12

2012

14

18

2013

115

20

114

13

CONCLUSION
Our review of the combined effect of the enactment of the AIA
and the evolving jurisprudence regarding motions to transfer in
various judicial districts reveals that the statistically significant
increase in NPE patent filings in the District of Delaware cannot be
dismissed as a statistical anomaly, but rather appears to be the fruit of
a calculated strategy adopted by the NPE bar to circumvent if not the
letter, at least the spirit of the anti-joinder provision of the AIA. Until
and unless the Federal Circuit harmonizes the transfer jurisprudence
114. Table reflects the outcome of motions to transfer for forum non conveniens as
reported by Docket Navigator. See Patent Litigation Statistics, DocketNavigator (Oct. 8, 2013),
https://www.docketnavigator.com/stats/. Table also only reflects instances where the motion
was granted, denied, and/or stipulated to by the parties. It does not reflect partial grants/denials,
nor instances where the motion was deemed moot by the court.
115. Our analysis of the orders granting and denying transfer motions reveal an interesting
split within the District of Delaware at least with respect to the “home turf” issue. In recent
opinions, it is clear that Judges Sleet and Andrews do not consider an entity’s state of
incorporation to be its “home turf.” In other words, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is not accorded
paramount weight when it chose to sue in its state of incorporation but is not physically located
there or has chosen to maintain operations elsewhere. Judge Stark, on the other hand, disagrees
stating that Delaware is “home turf” as long as a company is incorporated in Delaware
regardless of location of principal place of business. Compare Signal Tech LLC v. Analog
Devices, Inc., No. 11-CV-01073, 2012 WL 1134723 (D. Del. Apr. 3, 2012) (J. Andrews), and
Joao Control & Monitoring Sys. v. Ford, 12-CV-01479, 2013 WL 4496644 (D. Del. Aug. 21,
2013) (J. Sleet), with Graphics Prop. Holdings, Inc. v. ASUS Computer Int’l, Inc., No. 12-CV00210-LPS, 2013 WL 3295618, at *7-8 (D. Del. June 28, 2013) (J. Stark) (“The Court agrees
with those cases that include a corporate entity’s state of incorporation as part of its ‘home
turf.’”). For example, of the twenty transfer motions granted in the District of Delaware in
2013, ten were issued by Judge Andrews, and seven issued by Judge Sleet.
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between Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit district courts, it is likely
that this trend will continue and Delaware will take the “mantle” of
forum of choice for NPEs away from the Eastern District of Texas.

